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Abstract 
This paper examines long-term price overreactions in various financial markets 
(commodities, US stock market and FOREX). First, a number of statistical tests are carried 
out for overreactions as a statistical phenomenon. Second, a trading robot approach is 
applied to test the profitability of two alternative strategies, one based on the classical 
overreaction anomaly, the other on a so-called “inertia anomaly”. Both weekly and 
monthly data are used. Evidence of anomalies is found predominantly in the case of 
weekly data. In the majority of cases strategies based on overreaction anomalies are not 
profitable, and therefore the latter cannot be seen as inconsistent with the EMH.  
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is one of the central tenets of financial economics 
(Fama, 1965). However, the empirical literature has provided extensive evidence of 
various “anomalies”, such as fat tails, volatility clustering, long memory etc. that are 
inconsistent with the EMH paradigm and suggests that it is possible to make abnormal 
profits using appropriate trading strategies (Plastun, 2017). A well-known anomaly is the 
so-called overreaction hypothesis, namely the idea that agents make investment decisions 
giving disproportionate weight to more recent information (see De Bondt and Thaler, 
1985). Clements et al. (2009) report that the overreaction anomaly has not only persisted 
but in fact increased over the last twenty years. Its existence has been documented in 
several studies for different markets and frequencies such as monthly, weekly or daily data 
(see, e.g., Bremer and Sweeny, 1991; Clare and Thomas, 1995; Larson and Madura, 2006; 
Mynhardt and Plastun, 2013; Caporale et al. 2017). 
There exist a significant number of studies on market overreactions but most of them 
analyse short-term price overreactions based on daily data (Atkins and Dyl, 1990; Bremer 
and Sweeney, 1991; Cox and Peterson, 1994; Choi and Jayaraman, 2009) and focus only 
on a single market/asset. By contrast, this paper analyses long-term overreactions and a 
variety of markets and frequencies by (i) carrying out various statistical tests to establish 
whether overreaction anomalies exist using both weekly and monthly data, and (ii) using a 
trading robot method to examine whether they give rise to exploitable profit opportunities, 
i.e. whether price overreactions are simply a statistical phenomena or can also be seen as 
evidence against the EMH. The analysis is carried out for various financial markets: the 
US stock market (the Dow Jones Index and 10 companies included in this index), FOREX 
(10 currency pairs) and commodity markets (gold and oil). A similar investigation was 
carried out by Caporale et al. (2018); however, their analysis focused on short-term (i.e., 
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daily) overreactions, whilst the present study considers a longer horizon, namely a week or 
a month. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the overreaction hypothesis. Section 3 describes the methodology used in this 
study. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The seminal paper on the overreaction hypothesis is due to De Bondt and Thaler (DT, 
1985), who followed the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982), and showed that the best 
(worst) performing portfolios in the NYSE over a three-year period tended to under (over)-
perform over the following three-year period. Their explanation was that significant 
deviations of asset prices from their fundamental value occur because of agents’ irrational 
behaviour, with recent news being given an excessive weight. DT also reported an 
asymmetry in the overreaction (it is bigger for undervalued than for overvalued stocks), 
and a "January effect", with a clustering of overreactions in that particular month. 
Other studies  include Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988), who analysed NYSE data 
for the period 1946-1983 and reached similar conclusions to DT; Ferri and Min (1996), 
who confirmed the presence of overreactions using S&P 500 data for the period 1962-
1991; Larson and Madura (2003), who used NYSE data for the period 1988-1998 and also 
showed the presence of overreactions. Clement et al. (2009) confirmed the original 
findings of DT using CRSP data for the period 1926-1982, and also showed that the 
overreaction anomaly had increased during the following twenty years. 
In addition to papers analysing stock markets (Alonso and Rubio, 1990, Brailsford, 
1992, Bowman and Iverson, 1998, Antoniou et. al., 2005, Mynhardt and Plastun, 2013 
among others), some consider other markets such as the gold (Cutler, Poterba, and 
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Summers (1991)), or the options market (Poteshman, 2001). Finally, Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) showed that the returns used in many studies (supporting the overreaction 
hypothesis) are upwardly biased, and “true” returns have no relation to overreaction; 
therefore this issue is still unresolved.   
The other aspect of the overreaction hypothesis is its practical implementation, i.e. 
the possibility of obtaining extra profits by exploiting this anomaly. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) and Lehmann (1990) found that a strategy based on overreactions can indeed 
generate abnormal profits. Baytas and Cakiki (1999) also tested a trading strategy based on 
the overreaction hypothesis, and showed that contrarian portfolios on the long-term 
horizons can generate significant profits.  
The most recent and thorough investigation is due to Caporale et al. (2018), who 
analyse different financial markets (FOREX, stock and commodity) using the same 
approach as in the present study. That study shows that a strategy based on counter-
movements after overreactions does not generate profits in the FOREX and the commodity 
markets, but it is profitable in the case of the US stock market. Also, it detects a brand new 
anomaly based on the overreaction hypothesis, i.e. an “inertia” anomaly (after an 
overreaction day prices tend to move in the same direction for some time). Here we extend 
the analysis by considering long-term overreactions and the possibility of making extra 
profits over weekly and monthly intervals. The variety of assets and markets (FOREX, 
stock market, commodities) as well as of time frequencies (weekly, monthly) considered in 
this study can help to address issues such as robustness, data snooping, data mining etc. 
Moreover, since according to the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo, 2004) financial 
markets evolve and anomalies may disappear during this process, it is important to include 





3. Data and Methodology 
We analyse the following weekly and monthly series: for the US stock market, the Dow 
Jones index and stocks of two companies included in this index (Microsoft and Boeing - 
for the trading robot analysis we also add Alcoa, AIG, Walt Disney, General Electric, 
Home Depot, IBM, Intel, Exxon Mobil); for the FOREX, EURUSD, USDCHF and 
AUDUSD (for the trading robot analysis also USDJPY, USDCAD, GBPJPY, GBPUSD, 
EURJPY, GBPCHF, EURGBP); for commodities, gold and oil (only gold for the trading 
robot analysis owing to data unavailability). The choice of assets is based on their liquidity, 
trading volume, data availability, and extent of use. The sample covers the period from 
January 2002 till the end of December 2016, and for the trading robot analysis the period is 
2002-2014 for the FOREX and 2006-2014 for the US stock market and commodity market. 
These dates are selected on the basis of data availability (especially for the purpose of 
trading robot analysis) and to include the most recent data since markets can evolve as 
stressed by the Adaptive Market Hypothesis. 
 
3.1 Student’s t-tests 
First we carry out Student’s t-tests to confirm (reject) the presence of anomalies after 
overreactions. To provide additional evidence we also conduct ANOVA analysis, and 
carry out Mann–Whitney U tests not relying on the normality assumption.  
To identify anomalies we run multiple regressions including a dummy variable: 
Yt = a0 + a1 D1t + εt  (1) 
where Yt – volatility on the period t;  
a0– mean volatility for a normal day (the day when there was no volatility 
explosion); 
a1 – dummy coefficient; 
6 
 
D1t - a dummy variable for a specific data group, equal to 1 when the data belong to 
a day of volatility explosion, and equal to 0 when they do not; 
εt – Random error term for period t. 
The size, sign and statistical significance of the dummy coefficient provide 
information about possible anomalies.  
Then we apply the trading robot approach to establish whether the detected 
anomalies create exploitable profit opportunities. According to the classical overreaction 
hypothesis, an overreaction should be followed by a correction, i.e. price counter-
movements, and this should be bigger than after normal days. If one day is not enough for 
the market to incorporate new information, i.e. to overreact, then after one-day abnormal 
price changes one can expect movements in the direction of the overreaction bigger than 
after normal days. 
The two hypotheses to be tested are therefore: 
H1: Counter-reactions after overreactions differ from those after normal periods. 
H2: Price movements after overreactions in the direction of the overreaction differ 
from such movements after normal periods. 
The null hypothesis is in both cases that the data after normal and overreaction 
periods belong to the same population.   
As already mentioned, we focus on long-term overreactions, so the period of 
analysis is one week or one month. The parameters characterising price behaviour over 
such a time interval are maximum, minimum, open and close prices. In most studies price 
movements are measured as the difference between the open and close price. In our 
opinion the weekly (monthly) return, i.e. the difference between the maximum and 









      (2) 
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where iR is the % weekly (monthly) return, iHigh  is the maximum price, and iLow  is the 
minimum price for week (month) і. 
We consider three definitions of “overreaction”: 
1)  when the current weekly (monthly) return exceeds the average plus one 
standard deviation 
     ,)R(R nni             (3) 







                 (4) 










           (5) 
2) when the current weekly (monthly) return exceeds the average plus two standard 
deviations, i.e.,  
)2R(R nni  .           (6) 
3) when the current weekly (monthly) return exceeds the average plus three 
standard deviations, i.e.,  
)3R(R nni  .            (7) 
The next step is to determine the size of the price movement during the following 
week (month). For Hypothesis 1 (the counter-reaction or counter-movement assumption), 
we measure it as the difference between the next period’s open price and the maximum 
deviation from it in the opposite direction to the price movement in the overreaction 
period. 















   (8) 
where 1icR   is the counter-reaction size, and liOpen  is the next period’s open price. 













   (9) 
In the case of Hypothesis 2 (movement in the direction of the overreaction), either 
equation (9) or (8) is used depending on whether the price has increased or decreased.  
Two data sets (with 1icR  values) are then constructed, including the size of price 
movements after normal and abnormal price changes respectively. The first data set 
consists of 1icR  values after period with abnormal price changes. The second contains 
1icR  values after a period with normal price changes. The null hypothesis to be tested is 
that they are both drawn from the same population.  
 
 
3.2 Trading Robot Analysis 
The trading robot approach considers the long-term overreactions from a trader’s 
viewpoint, i.e. whether it is possible to make abnormal profits by exploiting the 
overreaction anomaly, and simulates the actions of a trader using an algorithm representing 
a trading strategy. This is a programme in the MetaTrader terminal that has been developed 
in MetaQuotes Language 4 (MQL4) and used for the automation of analytical and trading 
processes. Trading robots (called experts in MetaTrader) allow to analyse price data and 
manage trading activities on the basis of the signals received.   
MetaQuotes Language 4 is the language for programming trade strategies built in 
the client terminal. The syntax of MQL4 is quite similar to that of the C language. It allows 
to programme trading robots that automate trade processes and is ideally suited to the 
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implementation of trading strategies. The terminal also allows to check the efficiency of 
trading robots using historical data. These are saved in the MetaTrader terminal as bars and 
represent records appearing as TOHLCV (HST format). The trading terminal allows to test 
experts by various methods. By selecting smaller periods it is possible to see price 
fluctuations within bars, i.e., price changes will be reproduced more precisely. For 
example, when an expert is tested on one-hour data, price changes for a bar can be 
modelled using one-minute data. The price history stored in the client terminal includes 
only Bid prices. In order to model Ask prices, the strategy tester uses the current spread at 
the beginning of testing. However, a user can set a custom spread for testing in the 
"Spread", thereby approximating better actual price movements.  
We examine two trading strategies: 
- Strategy 1 (based on H1): This is based on the classical overreaction anomaly, 
i.e. the presence of abnormal counter-reactions after the overreaction period. The 
algorithm is constructed as follows: at the end of the overreaction period financial 
assets are sold or bought depending on whether abnormal price increases or 
decreased respectively have occurred. An open position is closed if a target profit 
value is reached or at the end of the following period (for details of how the target 
profit value is defined see below). 
- Strategy 2 (based on H2): This is based on the non-classical overreaction 
anomaly, i.e. the presence the abnormal price movements in the direction of the 
overreaction in the following period. The algorithm is built as follows: at the end of 
the overreaction period financial assets are bought or sold depending on whether 
abnormal price increases or decreases respectively have occurred. Again, an open 




The results of the trading strategy testing and some key data are presented in the 
"Report" in Appendix A. The most important indicators given in the “Report” are: 
- Total net profit: this is the difference between "Gross profit" and "Gross loss" 
measured in US dollars. We used marginal trading with the leverage 1:100, 
therefore it is necessary to invest $1000 to make the profit mentioned in the 
Trading Report. The annual return is defined as Total net profit/100, so, for 
instance, an annual total net profit of $100 represents a 10% annual return on 
the investment; 
- Profit trades: % of successful trades in total trades; 
- Expected payoff: the mathematical expectation of a win. This parameter 
represents the average profit/loss per trade. It is also the expected 
profitability/unprofitability of the next trade; 
- Total trades: total amount of trade positions; 
- Bars in test: the number of past observations modelled in bars during testing. 
The results are summarised in the “Graph” section of the “Report”: this represents 
the account balance and general account status considering open positions. The “Report” 
also provides full information on all the simulated transactions and their financial results. 
The following parameters affect the profitability of the trading strategies (the next section 
explains how they are set): 
- Criterion for overreaction (symbol: sigma_dz): the number of standard 
deviations added to the mean to form the standard period interval; 
- Period of averaging (period_dz): the size of the data set used to calculate base 
mean and standard deviation; 
- Time in position (time_val): how long the opened position has to be held. 
We carry out t-tests to examine whether the results we obtain are statistically 
different from the random ones. We chose this approach because the sample size is usually 
11 
 
less than 100. A t-test compares the means from two samples to see whether they come 
from the same population. In our case the first is the average profit/loss factor of one trade 
applying the trading strategy, and the second is equal to zero because random trading 
(without transaction costs) should generate zero profit.  
The null hypothesis (H0) is that the mean is the same in both samples, and the 
alternative (H1) that it is not. The computed values of the t-test are compared with the 
critical one at the 5% significance level. Failure to reject H0 implies that there are no 
advantages from exploiting the trading strategy being considered, whilst a rejection 
suggests that the adopted strategy can generate abnormal profits. 
Example of the t-test results are reported in Table 1. As can be seen the results 
obtained are not differing from the random ones. 
Table 1: t-test for the trading simulation results for Strategy 1 (case of 
EURUSD, testing period 2001-2014)* 
 
Parameter Value 
Number of the trades 96 
Total profit -1331.03 
Average profit per trade -13.86 
Standard deviation 192,27 
t-test -0.70 
z critical (0,95) 1.78 
Null hypothesis Accepted 
 
* For data sources see Appendix A 
As can be seen, H0 cannot be rejected, which implies that the trading simulation 
results are not statistically different from the random ones and therefore this trading 
strategy is not effective and there is no exploitable profit opportunity. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The first step is to set the basic overreaction parameters/criterions by choosing the number 
of standard deviations (sigma_dz) to be added to the average to form the “standard” period 
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interval for price fluctuations and the averaging period to calculate the mean and the 
standard deviation (symbol: period_dz). 
For this purpose we used the Dow Jones Index data for the time period 1991-2014. 
The number of abnormal returns detected in the period 1991-2014 is reported in Table 2 
(for weekly data) and Table 3 (for monthly data).  
 
Table 2: Number of abnormal returns detections in Dow-Jones index during 1991-
2014 (weekly data)  
Period_dz 3 5 10 20 30 
Indicator Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Overall 1241 100 1239 100 1233 100 1223 100 1213 100 
Number of abnormal 
returns (criterion 
=mean+sigma_dz)   251 20 239 19 206 17 198 16 198 16 
Number of abnormal 
returns (criterion= 
mean+2*sigma_dz)   0 0 0 0 56 5 65 5 69 6 
Number of abnormal 
returns (criterion = 
mean+3*sigma_dz)   0 0 0 0 0 0 13 1 19 2 
 
Table 3: Number of abnormal returns detections in Dow-Jones index during 1991-
2014 (monthly data)  
Period_dz 3 5 10 20 30 
Indicator Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Overall 285 100 283 100 278 100 268 100 258 100 
Number of abnormal 
returns (criterion 
=mean+sigma_dz)   56 20 52 18 45 16 42 15 44 15 
Number of abnormal 
returns (criterion= 
mean+2*sigma_dz)   0 0 0 0 16 6 20 7 22 8 
Number of abnormal 
returns (criterion = 
mean+3*sigma_dz)   0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 6 2 
 
As can be seen from the above tables, both parameters (averaging period and 
number of standard deviations added to the mean) affect the number of detected anomalies. 
Changes in the averaging period have relatively small effect on the number of detected 
anomalies (the difference between the results when the period considered is 5 and 30 
respectively is less than 20%). By contrast, each additional standard deviation significantly 
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decreases the number of observed abnormal returns. Therefore 2-4% of the full sample (the 
number of abnormal returns in the case of 3 sigmas) is not sufficiently representative to 
draw conclusions. To investigate whether sigma_dz equal to 1 is most appropriate we carry 
out t-tests of long-term counter-reactions for the Dow Jones index over the period 1991-
2014 (see Tables 4 and 5 for weekly and monthly data respectively). As can be seen, the 
anomaly is most easily detected in the case of sigma_dz= 1 (the t-stat is the biggest), and 
therefore we set sigma_dz equal to 1.  
 
Table 4: T-test of the counter-reactions after the overreaction for the Dow-Jones 
index during 1991-2014 (weekly data) for the different values of sigma_dz parameter 
case of period_dz=30     
Number of standard 
deviations 
1 2 3 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 198 1015 69 1144 19 1194 
Mean 2,36% 1,74% 2,77% 1,78% 3,57% 1,81% 
Standard deviation 2,22% 1,52% 2,43% 1,59% 3,15% 1,62% 
t-criterion 3,91 3,38 2,44 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 1,96 1,96 
Null hypothesis rejected rejected rejected 
 
 
Table 5: T-test of the counter-reactions after the overreaction for the Dow-Jones 
index during 1991-2014 (monthly data) for the different values of sigma_dz 
parameter case of period_dz=30     
Number of standard 
deviations 
1 2 3 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 44 214 22 236 6 252 
Mean 4,39% 3,22% 4,25% 3,34% 7,97% 3,31% 
Standard deviation 4,09% 2,83% 4,37% 2,96% 6,78% 2,90% 
t-criterion 1,90 0,98 1,68 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 1,96 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted 
 
Student’s t –tests of long-term counter-reactions for the Dow Jones index over the 
period 1991-2014 (Tables 6 and 7 for weekly and monthly data respectively) suggest that 
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the optimal averaging period is 30, their corresponding t-statistics being significantly 
higher than for other averaging periods. 
 
Table 6: T-test of the counter-reactions after the overreaction for the Dow-Jones 
index during 1991-2014 (weekly data) for the different averaging periods case of 
sigma_dz=1   
Period_dz 3 5 10 20 30 




239 1000 206 1027 198 1025 198 1015 




1,82% 1,61% 1,89% 1,60% 1,94% 1,59% 2,22% 1,52% 
t-criterion 2,45 2,26 2,50 3,51 3,91 
t-critical 
(р=0.95) 
1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 
Null 
hypothesis 
rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected 
 
Table 7: T-test of the counter-reactions after the overreaction for the Dow-Jones 
index during 1991-2014 (monthly data) for the different averaging periods case of 
sigma_dz=1     
Period_dz 3 5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of 
matches 56 229 52 230 45 233 42 226 44 214 
Mean 3,59% 3,40% 3,51% 3,42% 3,73% 3,37% 3,80% 3,32% 4,39% 3,22% 
Standard 
deviation 3,37% 2,94% 3,41% 2,95% 3,66% 2,93% 3,80% 2,90% 4,09% 2,83% 
t-criterion 0,40 0,20 0,66 0,82 1,90 
t-critical 
(р=0.95) 
1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 
Null 
hypothesis 
accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
 
Therefore the key parameters for the tests of long-term overreaction in different 
financial markets analysis are set as follows: the period_dz (averaging period) is set equal 
to 30 and sigma_dz (the number of standard deviations added to mean used as a criterion 
of overreaction) equal to 1.  
The results for H1 are presented in Appendix B (weekly data) and C (monthly data) 




   Table 8: Statistical tests results: case of Hypothesis 1 (weekly data)* 
 
Financial market FOREX Commodities US stock market 
Financial asset EURUSD USDCHF AUDUSD Gold Oil Boeing  Microsoft 
T-test - - - + + - - 
ANOVA - + + + + + - 
Mann–Whitney U test - - - + + + - 
Regression analysis 
with dummy variables 
- + + + + + - 
 
* ”+” – anomaly confirmed, “-” - anomaly not confirmed. 
 
As can be seen in the case of weekly data strong statistical evidence in favour of the 
overreaction anomaly can be found for both Gold and Oil prices, and to some extent for the 
US stock market (in the case of Boeing) and the FOREX (in the case of USDCHF and 
AUDUSD).  
 
   Table 9: Statistical tests results: case of Hypothesis 1 (monthly data)* 
 
Financial market FOREX Commodities US stock market 
Financial asset EURUSD USDCHF AUDUSD Gold Oil Boeing  Microsoft 
T-test - - - - - - - 
ANOVA - + - + - - - 
Mann–Whitney U test + - - - - - - 
Regression analysis 
with dummy variables 
- + - + - - - 
 
* ”+” – anomaly confirmed, “-” - anomaly not confirmed. 
 
The results for the monthly data are significantly different from those for the 
weekly ones. The evidence of anomalies almost completely disappears, except for 
EURUSD and USDCHF (in the case of the FOREX) and Gold (in the case of 
commodities).  
Overall, it appears that in the case of H1 weekly data provides the strongest 
evidence for the classical short-term counter-movement after an overreaction day, which is 
most noticeable in the case of commodities.  
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The results for H2 are presented in Appendix D (weekly data) and E (monthly data) 
and are summarised in Tables 10-11. 
  
   
 
 Table 10: Statistical tests results: case of Hypothesis 2 (weekly data)* 
 
Financial market FOREX Commodities US stock market 
Financial asset EURUSD USDCHF AUDUSD Gold Oil Boeing  Microsoft 
T-test + - + - + - + 
ANOVA + + + + + - + 
Mann–Whitney U test + - + - + - + 
Regression analysis 
with dummy variables 
+ + + + + - + 
 
* ”+” – anomaly confirmed, “-” - anomaly not confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is not rejected in many cases with weekly data. We find very strong 
evidence in favour of an “inertia anomaly” (prices tend to move in the direction of the 
overreaction in the following period). This applies to EURUSD and AUDUSD, Oil and 
Microsoft data, and represents evidence of market inefficiency caused by overreactions. 
 
   Table 11: Statistical tests results: case of Hypothesis 2 (monthly data)* 
 
Financial market FOREX Commodities US stock market 
Financial asset EURUSD USDCHF AUDUSD Gold Oil Boeing  Microsoft 
T-test - - - + + - - 
ANOVA - + + + + - + 
Mann–Whitney U test - - + + + - - 
Regression analysis with 
dummy variables 
- + + + + - + 
 
* ”+” – anomaly confirmed, “-” - anomaly not confirmed. 
The results for the monthly data again are significantly differing from those for the 
weekly ones. Evidence in favour of the inertia anomaly is present for commodities and 
only for AUSUSD in the FOREX.  
Overall the results from testing Hypothesis 2 suggest that the weekly frequency is 
the most appropriate to detect the inertia anomaly. The commodity market again look like 
the most inefficient among those analysed. 
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The general conclusion from the statistical tests are as follows: anomalies are 
generally detected using weekly but not monthly data; the commodity markets are the most 
affected by the overreaction anomalies; the results for the FOREX and US stock markets 
are mixed. 
Next, we analyse whether these anomalies give rise to exploitable profit 
opportunities. If they do not, we conclude that they do not represent evidence inconsistent 
with the EMH. We expand the list of assets in order to provide more extensive results. The 
complete list of assets includes: FOREX (EURUSD, USDCHF, AUDUSD, USDJPY, 
USDCAD, GBPJPY, GBPUSD, EURJPY, GBPCHF, EURGBP), US stock market (Alcoa, 
AIG, Boeing Company, Walt Disney, General Electric, Home Depot, IBM, Intel, 
Microsoft, Exxon Mobil), commodity (Gold). 
The parameters of the trading strategies 1 and 2 are set as follows:  
- Period_dz = 30 (see above for an explanation); 
- Time_val = week  (see above); 
- Sigma_dz=1 (see above). 
The results of the trading robot analysis are presented in Table 12 (Strategy 1) and 
Table 13 (Strategy 2). The testing periods are as follows FOREX: 2001-2014; US stock 
market: 2006-2014; Commodities: 2006-2014. 
 













EURUSD 108 63% -1584 -158,4% -11,3% Accepted 
USDCHF 112 63% -1815 -181,5% -13,0% Accepted 
AUDUSD 114 66% -1 690 -169,0% -12,1% Accepted 
USDJPY 116 69% 1 662 166,2% 11,9% Rejected 
USDCAD 118 66% -2 121 -212,1% -15,2% Accepted 
GBPJPY 111 71% 3 541 354,1% 25,3% Rejected 
GBPUSD 116 68% -135 -13,5% -1,0% Accepted 
EURJPY 107 64% -1 829 -182,9% -13,1% Accepted 
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GBPCHF 106 74% 3 721 372,1% 26,6% Rejected 
EURGBP 118 71% 169 16,9% 1,2% Accepted 
US stock market 
Alcoa 64 63% -2280 -228,0% -25,3% Accepted 
AIG 64 67% 480 48,0% 5,3% Accepted 
Boeing Company 87 71% 3290 329,0% 36,6% Rejected 
Walt Disney 63 70% -289 -28,9% -3,2% Accepted 
General electric 67 64% -39 -3,9% -0,4% Accepted 
Home Depot 79 64% 290 29,0% 3,2% Accepted 
IBM 65 63% -3090 -309,0% -34,3% Accepted 
Intel 70 54% -1055 -105,5% -11,7% Accepted 
Microsoft 74 66% 430 43,0% 4,8% Accepted 
Exxon Mobil 72 67% 773 77,3% 8,6% Accepted 
Commodities 
Gold 78 64,0% -2091 -209,1% -23,2% Accepted 
 
Strategy 1, based on the classical overreaction hypothesis, trades on counter-
reactions after periods of abnormal price dynamics. In general, it is unprofitable in the case 
of the FOREX (7 pairs out of 10 produce negative or statistically insignificant results) and 
commodity markets (in the case of Gold). For the US stock market the results are mixed 
(50% of profitable assets), but in general this anomaly does not seem to be exploitable. The 
assets to be traded on the basis of the classical overreaction hypothesis with weekly data 
are therefore: GBPCHF (ROI=27% per year), GBPJPY (25%), USDJPY (12%) and 
Boeing (36.6%). Although as previously shown a non-rejection of the null does not 
necessarily mean that there exist profit opportunities, it appears that it does mean a higher 
chance of profitable trading.  













EURUSD 112 58% 848 84,8% 6,1% Rejected 
USDCHF 119 57% 690 69,0% 4,9% Rejected 
AUDUSD 117 56% 416 41,6% 3,0% Accepted 
USDJPY 116 50% -479 -47,9% -3,4% Accepted 
USDCAD 117 58% 1 829 182,9% 13,1% Rejected 
GBPJPY 114 47% -6 766 -676,6% -48,3% Accepted 
GBPUSD 116 53% -566 -56,6% -4,0% Accepted 
EURJPY 107 58% 476 47,6% 3,4% Accepted 
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GBPCHF 106 48% -2 991 -299,1% -21,4% Accepted 
EURGBP 118 49% -2 609 -260,9% -18,6% Accepted 
US stock market 
Alcoa 68 51% 877 87,7% 9,7% Rejected 
AIG 65 60% 2390 239,0% 26,6% Rejected 
Boeing Company 87 44% -2470 -247,0% -27,4% Accepted 
Walt Disney 62 47% -1475 -147,5% -16,4% Accepted 
General electric 69 51% 410 41,0% 4,6% Accepted 
Home Depot 79 47% -1557 -155,7% -17,3% Accepted 
IBM 65 38% -9236 -923,6% -102,6% Accepted 
Intel 70 50% -36,4 -3,6% -0,4% Accepted 
Microsoft 74 40% -1814 -181,4% -20,2% Accepted 
Exxon Mobil 71 50% -1711 -171,1% -19,0% Accepted 
Commodities 
Gold 78 58,0% 1011 101,1% 11,2% Rejected 
 
Strategy 2, based on the so-called “inertia anomaly”, trades on price movements in 
the direction of the overreaction in the following period. In general it is unprofitable for the 
US stock market (7 assets out of the 10 analysed produce negative results), whilst the 
results are mixed for the FOREX (there are 50% of profitable assets, but only 3 of the 5 
profitable assets pass the t-test on randomness). There is evidence of profit opportunities in 
the commodity markets. The assets to be traded on the basis of the inertia anomaly with 
weekly data are therefore: USDCAD (ROI=13% per year), USDCHF (5%), EURUSD 
(6%), AIG (27%), Alcoa (10%) and Gold (11%). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines long-term price overreactions in various financial markets 
(commodities, US stock market and FOREX). It addresses the issue of whether they should 
be seen simply as a statistical phenomenon or instead as anomalies giving rise to 
exploitable profit opportunities, only the latter being inconsistent with the EMH paradigm. 
The analysis is conducted in two steps. First, a number of statistical tests are carried out for 
overreactions as a statistical phenomenon. Second, a trading robot approach is applied to 
test the profitability of two alternative strategies, one based on the classical overreaction 
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anomaly (H1: counter-reactions after overreactions differ from those after normal periods), 
the other on an “inertia” anomaly (H2: price movements after overreactions in the same 
direction of the overreaction differ from those after normal periods). Both weekly and 
monthly data are used. Evidence of anomalies is found predominantly in the case of 
weekly data.  
More specifically, H1 cannot be rejected for the US stock market and commodity 
markets when the averaging period is 30, whilst it is rejected for the FOREX. The results 
for H2 are more mixed and provide evidence of an “inertia” anomaly in the commodity 
market and for some assets in the US stock market and FOREX. The trading robot analysis 
shows that in general strategies based on the overreaction anomalies are not profitable, and 
therefore the latter cannot be seen as inconsistent with the EMH. However, in some cases 
abnormal profits can be made; in particular this is true of (i) GBPCHF (ROI=27% per 
year), GBPJPY (25%), Boeing (36%), ExxonMobil (8.6%) in the case of the classical 
overreaction hypothesis and weekly data, and (ii) USDCAD (13%), USDCHF (5%), 
EURUSD (6%), AIG (27%), Alcoa (10%) and Gold (11%) in the case of the inertia 
anomaly and also with weekly data.  
A comparison between these results and the daily ones reported in Caporale et al. 
(2017) suggests that the classic overreaction anomaly (H1) occurs at both short- and long-
term intervals in the case of the US stock market and commodity markets. The results for 
the FOREX are mixed at both intervals, but mostly suggest no contrarian movements after 
overreactions. The findings concerning the “inertia” anomaly (H2) are more stable and 
consistent: it is detected for the commodity markets and US stock market at both short- and 
long-term horizons. As for the FOREX, there is a short- but not a long-term anomaly in 
most cases. The trading results imply that there is no single profitable strategy: the findings 
are quite sensitive to the specific asset being considered, and therefore it is necessary to 
investigate case by case whether it is possible to earn abnormal profits by exploiting the 
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classical overreaction and/or inertia anomaly. Future research will extend the analysis 
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Example of strategy tester report: case of EURUSD, period 2001-2014, H1 testing 
Table A.1 – Overall statistics 
Symbol EURUSD (Euro vs US Dollar) 
Period 
1 Hour (H1) 2001.01.01 00:00 - 2014.11.24 23:00 (2001.01.01 - 
2015.01.01) 
Model 
Every tick (the most precise method based on all available least 
timeframes) 
Parameters 
profit_koef=10; stop=10; sigma_koef=1; period_dz=30; 
time_val=600000; 
Bars in test 87109 Ticks modelled 92878183 Modelling quality 90.00% 
Initial deposit 10000.00     Spread 
Current 
(15) 
Total net profit -1331.03 Gross profit 6349.26 Gross loss -7680.29 
Profit factor 0.83 Expected payoff -13.86   
 
























Largest profit trade 200.06 loss trade -999.97 
Average profit trade 129.58 loss trade -163.41 
Maximum 
consecutive wins 













(count of losses) 
-1298.77 
(5) 
Average consecutive wins 2 consecutive losses 2 
 





Table A.2 – Statement (fragment) 
# Time Type Order Size Price S / L T / P Profit Balance 
1 16.03.2001 22:00 buy 1 0.10 0.89765 0.79765 0.91765 
 
2 23.03.2001 20:40 close 1 0.10 0.88880 0.79765 0.91765 -89.97 9910.03 
3 25.01.2002 22:00 buy 2 0.10 0.86585 0.76585 0.88585 
 
4 01.02.2002 20:40 close 2 0.10 0.86160 0.76585 0.88585 -43.97 9866.06 
5 17.05.2002 22:00 sell 3 0.10 0.92100 1.02100 0.90100 
 
6 24.05.2002 20:40 close 3 0.10 0.92095 1.02100 0.90100 0.57 9866.63 
7 31.05.2002 22:00 sell 4 0.10 0.93250 1.03250 0.91250 
 
8 07.06.2002 20:40 close 4 0.10 0.94335 1.03250 0.91250 -108.43 9758.20 
9 21.06.2002 22:00 sell 5 0.10 0.97130 1.07130 0.95130 
 
10 28.06.2002 20:40 close 5 0.10 0.99075 1.07130 0.95130 -194.43 9563.77 
11 28.06.2002 22:00 sell 6 0.10 0.99100 1.09100 0.97100 
 
12 05.07.2002 20:40 close 6 0.10 0.97335 1.09100 0.97100 176.57 9740.34 
13 05.07.2002 22:00 buy 7 0.10 0.97335 0.87335 0.99335 
 
14 09.07.2002 13:30 t/p 7 0.10 0.99335 0.87335 0.99335 199.58 9939.92 
15 19.07.2002 22:00 sell 8 0.10 1.01460 1.11460 0.99460 
 
16 23.07.2002 8:59 t/p 8 0.10 0.99460 1.11460 0.99460 200.02 10139.94 
17 26.07.2002 22:00 buy 9 0.10 0.98745 0.88745 1.00745 
 
18 02.08.2002 20:40 close 9 0.10 0.98710 0.88745 1.00745 -4.97 10134.97 
19 20.09.2002 22:00 sell 10 0.10 0.98180 1.08180 0.96180 
 
20 27.09.2002 20:40 close 10 0.10 0.97985 1.08180 0.96180 19.57 10154.54 
21 01.11.2002 22:00 sell 11 0.10 0.99660 1.09660 0.97660 
 
22 08.11.2002 20:41 close 11 0.10 1.01335 1.09660 0.97660 -167.43 9987.11 
23 07.03.2003 22:00 sell 12 0.10 1.10060 1.20060 1.08060 
 
24 13.03.2003 19:55 t/p 12 0.10 1.08060 1.20060 1.08060 200.06 10187.17 
25 14.03.2003 22:00 buy 13 0.10 1.07445 0.97445 1.09445 
 
26 21.03.2003 20:40 close 13 0.10 1.05286 0.97445 1.09445 -217.37 9969.80 
27 21.03.2003 22:00 buy 14 0.10 1.05275 0.95275 1.07275 
 
28 27.03.2003 9:51 t/p 14 0.10 1.07275 0.95275 1.07275 198.74 10168.54 
29 02.05.2003 22:00 sell 15 0.10 1.12310 1.22310 1.10310 
 
30 09.05.2003 20:40 close 15 0.10 1.14921 1.22310 1.10310 -261.03 9907.51 
31 09.05.2003 22:00 sell 16 0.10 1.14930 1.24930 1.12930 
 
32 16.05.2003 20:40 close 16 0.10 1.15625 1.24930 1.12930 -69.43 9838.08 
33 20.06.2003 22:00 buy 17 0.10 1.16065 1.06065 1.18065 
 
34 27.06.2003 20:40 close 17 0.10 1.14195 1.06065 1.18065 -188.47 9649.61 
35 01.08.2003 22:00 buy 18 0.10 1.12625 1.02625 1.14625 
 
36 08.08.2003 20:40 close 18 0.10 1.13053 1.02625 1.14625 41.33 9690.94 
37 22.08.2003 22:00 buy 19 0.10 1.08905 0.98905 1.10905 
 
38 29.08.2003 20:40 close 19 0.10 1.09770 0.98905 1.10905 85.03 9775.97 
39 05.09.2003 22:00 sell 20 0.10 1.11070 1.21070 1.09070 
 






Statistical tests of Hypothesis 1, case of weekly data 
 
       Table B.1: T-test of Hypothesis 1, case of foreign exchange market (weekly data) 
  
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY AUDUSD 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 115 634 113 636 116 633 
Mean 1,14% 1,13% 1,60% 1,19% 1,63% 1,27% 
Standard deviation 1,00% 0,87% 3,60% 0,94% 2,07% 1,13% 
t-criterion 0,10 1,20 1,79 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted 
  
       Table B.2: T-test of Hypothesis 1, case of US Stock Market and Commodities 
(weekly data) 
  
Type of a market Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 114 638 119 630 76 389 102 649 
Mean 2.46% 1.74% 4.45% 3.31% 3.44% 2.74% 2.96% 2.48% 
Standard deviation 2.88% 1.67% 4.10% 3.21% 2.91% 2.83% 3.04% 2.60% 
t-criterion 2.60 2.88 1.93 1.50 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis rejected rejected accepted accepted 
 
      Table B.3: ANOVA test of Hypothesis 1 (weekly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
F 0,04 7,53 6,20 14,65 6,17 4,28 3,14 
P value 0,85 0.006 0,01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 
F critical 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,85 3,87 3,86 3,85 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected accepted 
 
      Table B.4: Mann–Whitney U test of Hypothesis 1 (weekly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Adjusted H 0,07 1,87 0,74 5,32 42.08 7.59 1.58 
d.f. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P value 0,79 0,17 0,39 0,02 0.00 0.01 0.21 
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 




Table B.5: Regression analysis with dummy variables of Hypothesis 1 (weekly data) 
Parameter/ Type of asset FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Parameter/ Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 

















































confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed not 
confirmed 




Statistical tests of Hypothesis 1, case of monthly data 
 
       Table C.1: T-test of Hypothesis 1, case of foreign exchange market (monthly 
data) 
  
Type of asset EURUSD USDCHF AUDUSD 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 22 129 16 135 26 125 
Mean 2.82% 2.15% 3.77% 2.55% 4.12% 2.77% 
Standard deviation 2.13% 2.16% 4.25% 3.19% 3.50% 2.36% 
t-criterion 1.37 1.11 1.88 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted 
 
       Table C.2: T-test of Hypothesis 1, case of US Stock Market and Commodities 
(monthly data) 
  
Type of a market Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 25 126 23 128 9 80 21 130 
Mean 6.42% 4.06% 6.88% 6.30% 4.16% 4.96% 5.77% 5.08% 
Standard deviation 6.80% 3.16% 6.77% 6.28% 4.67% 4.66% 5.26% 4.73% 
t-criterion 1.70 0.38 0.48 0.56 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted accepted 
 
      Table C.3: ANOVA test of Hypothesis 1 (monthly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
F 2.50 7.07 2.69 8.76 0.33 0.05 0.67 
P value 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.56 0.81 0.41 
F critical 3.90 3.84 3.90 3.90 3.90 3.95 3.90 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected accepted rejected accepted accepted accepted 
 
      Table C.4: Mann–Whitney U test of Hypothesis 1 (monthly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Adjusted H 4.84 2.82 1.87 1.89 0.38 0.05 0.36 
d.f. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P value 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.54 0.82 0.55 
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 




Table C.5: Regression analysis with dummy variables of Hypothesis 1 (monthly data) 
Parameter/ Type of asset FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Parameter/ Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 





























































Statistical tests of Hypothesis 2, case of weekly data 
 
       Table D.1: T-test of Hypothesis 2, case of foreign exchange market (weekly data) 
  
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 115 634 116 633 113 635 
Mean 1,29% 1,01% 1,72% 1,30% 1,33% 1,09% 
Standard deviation 1,22% 0,93% 2,38% 1,17% 1,52% 0,88% 
t-criterion 2,32 2,86 1.59 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis rejected rejected accepted 
 
       Table D.2: T-test of Hypothesis 2, case of US Stock Market and Commodities 
(weekly data) 
  
Type of a market Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 114 638 119 630 76 389 102 649 
Mean 2,39% 1,98% 4,64% 3,17% 2,89% 2,77% 2,75% 2,20% 
Standard deviation 2,48% 1,73% 4,82% 2,92% 3,45% 3,14% 2,48% 2,27% 
t-criterion 1.69 3.21 0.27 2.12 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected accepted rejected 
 
      Table D.3: ANOVA test of Hypothesis 2 (weekly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
F 8.46 9.05 5.64 5.05 20.69 0.13 5.55 
P value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.02 
F critical 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.86 3.85 
Null hypothesis rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected 
 
      Table D.4: Mann–Whitney U test of Hypothesis 2 (weekly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Adjusted H 9,09 4,51 1,83 2,56 38,09 0,00 6,04 
d.f. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P value 0,00 0,03 0,18 0,11 0,00 0,99 0,01 
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 




Table D.5: Regression analysis with dummy variables of Hypothesis 2 (weekly data) 
Parameter/ Type of asset FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Parameter/ Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 













































Multiple R 0,11 0,11 0,09 0,12 0,16 0,01 0,08 
Anomaly 
confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed not 
confirmed 
confirmed 




Statistical tests of Hypothesis 2, case of monthly data 
 
       Table E.1: T-test of Hypothesis 2, case of foreign exchange market (monthly data) 
  
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 22 129 26 125 16 135 
Mean 2,53% 2,18% 4,35% 2,38% 3,85% 2,12% 
Standard deviation 2,92% 1,80% 6,36% 2,30% 4,02% 1,76% 
t-criterion 0.55 1.56 1.70 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted 
 
       Table E.2: T-test of Hypothesis 2, case of US Stock Market and Commodities 
(monthly data) 
  
Type of a market Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal Abnormal normal Abnormal normal 
Number of matches 25 126 23 128 9 80 21 130 
Mean 6,23% 3,78% 17,64% 7,22% 6,70% 5,54% 7,59% 4,91% 
Standard deviation 4,20% 3,81% 17,01% 6,09% 6,33% 5,23% 8,52% 4,49% 
t-criterion 2,70 2,90 0.53 1.41 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1.96 
Null hypothesis rejected rejected accepted accepted 
 
      Table E.3: ANOVA test of Hypothesis 2 (monthly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
F 0.95 8.64 12.38 9.87 32.49 0.96 5.98 
P value 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.01 
F critical 3.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 3.95 3.90 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected rejected rejected rejected accepted rejected 
 
      Table E.4: Mann–Whitney U test of Hypothesis 2 (monthly data) 
Type of a market FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 
Adjusted H 0,19 4,18 3,51 10,82 9,59 0,54 1,50 
d.f. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P value 0,66 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,46 0,22 
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 




Table E.5: Regression analysis with dummy variables of Hypothesis 2 (monthly data) 
Parameter/ Type of asset FOREX Commodities US Stock Market 
Parameter/ Type of asset EURUSD AUDUSD USDCHF Gold Oil Boeing Microsoft 

















































confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed not 
confirmed 
confirmed 
* P-values are in parentheses 
 
